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Abstract
I propose a new implementation of the q-theory of investment using corporate bond
yields instead of equity prices. In q-theory, the optimal investment rate is a function
of risk-adjusted discount rates and of future marginal profitability. Corporate bond
prices also depend on these variables. I show that, when aggregate shocks are small,
aggregate q is a linear combination of risk free rates and average yields on risky corporate
debt. The yield-theory of investment, unlike its equity-based counter part, is empirically
successful: it can account for more than half of the volatility of investment in post-war
US data, it drives out cash flows from the investment equation, and it delivers sensible
estimates for the parameters of the adjustment cost function.
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I propose a new implementation of the q-theory of investment using corporate bond
yields instead of equity prices. According to q-theory, investment should be an increasing
function of marginal q, defined as the net present value of the future marginal product of
capital. Hayashi (1982) shows that, with constant returns to scale, marginal and average q
are the same. Therefore, the ratio of the market value of unlevered equity over the existing
capital stock should be a sufficient statistic for the investment rate. Unfortunately, the
implementation of the theory using equity has not been successful (see Caballero (1999) for
a recent survey).
Just like Hayashi (1982), I use a model with constant returns to scale and convex costs
of adjustment. Thus, in my setup, marginal and average q are the same. The innovation
is that I use the corporate bond market, as opposed to the equity market, to construct
my proxy for q. Just like equity prices, corporate bond prices react to changes in the risk-
adjusted discount rate and to news about future profitability. When aggregate shocks are
small and there is a continuous distribution of firm level shocks, I show that bond prices
are in fact proportional to q. After deriving the yield-based equation, I find that, unlike
its equity counter-part, this investment equation is empirically successful: it can account
for more than half of the volatility of investment in post-war US data, it drives out cash
flow variables, and it delivers quantitatively sensible estimates for the parameters of the
adjustment cost function.
The yield-theory is successful because yield spreads of corporate bonds over treasuries
forecast investment. It is well-known (Bernanke (1983) and Stock and Watson (1989)) that
credit spreads have forecasting power for output, but there has been much disagreement
about how one should interpret this fact. My work suggests a straightforward interpretation:
this is just q-theory. In particular, it does not require that firms be credit constraint, or
that financial markets be imperfect. As an aside, I also find that corporate credit spreads
forecast output through corporate investment, not consumption or residential investment.
Beyond the macroeconomic literature already mentioned, this paper is related to Cochrane
(1996) who studies the joint dynamics of physical and financial returns, Lettau and Lud-
vigson (2002) who emphasize the role of time varying risk premia, and Zhang (2005) who
shows how irreversibility and counter-cyclical risk premia could explain the value premium.
Finally, I build on the credit risk literature pioneered by Merton (1974). Berndt, Douglas,
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Duffie, Ferguson, and Schranz (2005) and Pan and Singleton (2005) estimate credit risk
premia from default swap rates, respectively for US corporate and sovereign bonds, and
find large and volatile risk premia. Almeida and Philippon (2005) show that risk premia
are of first order importance for capital structure decisions.
In section 1, I present the setup of the model. In section 2, I derive the approximations
to the value function and to the investment policy function that are needed to establish
the main result. In section 3, I show how one can use corporate bond spreads to build a
sufficient statistic for aggregate investment. Section 4 contains empirical evidence on the
relevance of the theory and on the implied adjustment costs. Section 5 contains robustness
checks, including numerical simulations in section 5.4. In the last section, I summarize
the results in the context of existing theories of investment, and I discuss some remaining
puzzles.
1 Model
I present a model of investment with aggregate shocks to discount rates, risk premia and av-
erage profitability, as well as idiosyncratic profitability shocks. This is a partial equilibrium
model and the pricing kernel is specified exogenously.
1.1 Technology and Pricing Kernel
I now describe the technology of the firms, and the stochastic processes for aggregate and
idiosyncratic shocks.
Cash Flows
The state of the aggregate economy is an integer st ∈ [1, 2.., S] which evolves according to a
stationary Markov chain with transition matrix P . Abusing notations, I will also use S to
denote the aggregate state space. Firms are subject to aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks.
The profits of a firm with idiosyncratic shock η in state s are
(a (s) + η − Γ (x)) k, (1)
where k is the firm’s capital stock and x := ik − δ is the investment rate, i is investment
and δ is the depreciation rate. The function Γ (.) is strictly convex, and the aggregate profit
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rate a (.) is normalized so that Γ (0) = 0.1 Capital accumulates according to
kt+1 = (1 + xt)kt. (2)
Risk Neutral Probabilities
The state s characterizes the aggregate economy, and the pricing kernel between state s and
s0 is ms,s0 . Let pst,st+1 be the objective probability of st+1 given st. Let m¯s be the price of
a one period risk free bond in state s and let rs be the corresponding risk free rate
1
1 + rs
:= m¯s =
X
s0∈S
ps,s0ms,s0 .
The risk neutral probability πs,s0 is defined by
πs,s0 :=
ms,s0
m¯s
ps,s0 ,
and the risk-adjusted transition matrix is Π =
£
πs,s0
¤
s∈S,s0∈S. I assume that Π is stationary
with a unique invariant distribution, π¯s, which solves π¯s0 =
P
s∈S π¯sπs,s0 .
Idiosyncratic Shocks
The idiosyncratic component of profits follows a continuous Markov process over a compact
interval Ω ⊂ R with a transition density ζ
¡
ηt, ηt+1
¢
which is independent of the state of
the economy. The economy has reached its ergodic steady state for idiosyncratic shocks,
and the ergodic distribution of η is ζ¯ (.). By definition, the ergodic distribution is such that
ζ¯ (η0) =
R
Ω ζ (η, η
0) ζ¯ (η) dη. Finally, I normalize the mean of η to zero:
R
Ω ηζ¯ (η) dη = 0.
1.2 Program of the Firm
The value of the firm at time 0 is
V0 = E
∞X
t=0
m (t) (a (st) + ηt − Γ (xt)) kt (3)
where
m (0) = 1 and m (t) = ms0,s1 × ..mst−1,st
1This functional form is the general case when the production function has constant returns to scale and
there is no adjustment cost for labor. Start from the traditional formulation of cash flows (a˜+ η) k − i −
kΓ˜
 i
k

, where a˜+ η is the profit rate net of wages, and Γ˜
 i
k

the adjustment cost per-unit of capital. Using
x, I then define a = a˜− δ − Γ˜ (δ) and Γ (x) = x+ Γ˜ (x+ δ)− Γ˜ (δ) and I obtain (1).
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The program of the firm is to maximize (3) with respect to the sequence {xt}t≥0 and subject
to the capital accumulation constraint (2) and the initial condition (k0, s0, η0). I assume that
the solution to this program is finite and strictly positive for all possible initial conditions
(k0, s0, η0) ∈ R++ × S × Ω. Since the technology exhibits constant returns to scale, it is
useful to consider the scaled value function
vt :=
Vt
kt
.
The function v (.) solves
v (s, η) = max
x>−1
©
a (s) + η − Γ (x) + (1 + x) m¯sEπ
£
v
¡
s0, η0
¢ |s, η¤ª , (4)
and the transversality condition is
lim
τ→∞
E [mt,τ (1 + xt) ..× .. (1 + xτ ) vτ |st, ηt] = 0. (5)
1.3 Investment
The first order condition for investment is
γ (x (s, η)) = m¯sEπ
£
v
¡
s0, η0
¢ |s, η¤ , (6)
where
R x
0 γ (t) dt := Γ (x). I assume that limx→−1 γ (x) = −∞ and limx→∞ γ (x) = +∞,
so that the solution is always interior. Equation (6) says that investment is equal to the
expected discounted marginal product of capital, usually called marginal q. With constant
returns to scale, the marginal product of capital is equal to the average product of capital.
One way to test this theory is to use the value of unlevered equity over physical assets as
a measure of q, but it has not worked well in practice (see Caballero (1999) for a recent
survey). I discuss potential explanations for this lack of success in the last section of the
paper. Instead of using equity, I argue that one can use corporate bond spreads to estimate
equation (6).
1.4 Debt Policy
I assume that the Modigliani-Miller assumptions hold. Default can happen, but default
does not entail any deadweight loss. In case of default, the creditors take over the assets,
but the firm continues to operate. In the Modigliani-Miller world, debt policy does not
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affect firm value. It does, however, affect bond spreads, so I must specify debt dynamics
before I can use bond prices to estimate the net present value of the marginal product of
capital. I consider two polar cases: short term debt and perpetuity.
Short Term Debt
The firm issues at time t a one period bond with face value dtkt+1, where the book leverage
dt might be a function of the state of the firm (st, ηt). The price of the bond is then
Bt = btkt+1, where the pricing function solves
b (s, η) = m¯sEπ
£
min
¡
v
¡
s0, η0
¢
, d (s, η)
¢ |s, η¤ (7)
Perpetuity
Empirically, firms continuously issue and retire long term debt in order to keep their leverage
ratio within reasonable bounds. To capture this in a simple way, I assume that firms keep
the total coupon payments on long term debt a constant fraction c of their capital stock k.
In case of default, each creditor therefore recovers v, and the value of each perpetuity solves
b∞ (s, η) = m¯sEπ
£
min
¡
v
¡
s0, η0
¢
, c+ b∞
¡
s0, η0
¢¢ |s, η¤ (8)
2 First Order Approximations
In this section, I present approximations to the value and policy functions that are needed
to show how one can use (7) or (8) to estimate the right hand side of (6). To make the
statements more precise, define the vectors
A =
⎡
⎣
a (1)
..
a (S)
⎤
⎦ ; M¯ =
⎡
⎣
m¯ (1)
..
m¯ (S)
⎤
⎦ ,
and the norm over vectors and functions of s as
kAk := sup
s∈S
|a (s)| .
Similarly, for a function that depends on both η and s
kv (., .)k := sup
s∈S,η∈Ω
|v (s, η)| .
Note that Ω is compact so the sup is a max for continuous functions. I start by considering
two polar cases: an economy with one representative firm, and then an economy with no
aggregate risk.
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2.1 No Idiosyncratic Shocks
In this section, I assume that the idiosyncratic shock η is identically equal to zero, i.e.
kΩk = 0, and I focus on aggregate shocks. Consider first the pseudo-steady state defined as
the steady state of an economy where the profit rate is constant and equal to a¯ := Eπ [a (s)],
and the discount factor is m¯ := Eπ [m¯s]. Combining equation (4) evaluated at the pseudo-
steady state, v¯ = a¯ − Γ (x¯) + (1 + x¯) m¯v¯, with the first order condition for investment
γ (x¯) = m¯v¯, I find that the pseudo-steady state is characterized by
Γ (x¯) + (r − x¯) γ (x¯)− a¯ = 0, (9)
where r := 1−m¯m¯ is the steady state interest rate.
Lemma 1 Equation (9) has at most one solution over (−1, r] and one over [r,∞). If
rγ (0) < a¯ < Γ (r) , (10)
then there exists a unique solution x¯ ∈ (0, r) which does not violate the transversality con-
dition (5).
Proof. See appendix
With no uncertainty, condition (10) is necessary and sufficient for balanced growth with
finite firm value. It is also necessary and sufficient when uncertainty is small enough.2
From now on, I assume that condition (10) is satisfied. The unique solution of (4) that
satisfies (5) is also the solution to the original problem of the firm. Let va (.) be the solution
for the particular case of no idiosyncratic shocks, and let xa (.) be the corresponding policy
function. Clearly, va (.) converges to v¯ when kA− a¯k + °°M¯ − m¯°° → 0. To approximate
va (.)− v¯, I define the stochastic process vˆ (.) as the solution to
vˆ (s) := as − a¯+ (1 + x¯) v¯ (m¯s − m¯) + (1 + x¯) m¯Eπ
£
vˆ
¡
s0
¢ |s¤ , (11)
and the stochastic process xˆ (s) as
xˆ (s) :=
v¯ (m¯s − m¯) + m¯Eπ [vˆ (s0)]
γ1
, (12)
2For instance, by imposing that rγ (0) < min (a) and max (a) < Γ (r) .
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where the curvature parameter is γ1 :=
∂γ
∂x (x¯). I now show that v¯+ vˆ (.) is the correct first
order approximation of va (.) when aggregate shocks are small. The next Lemma says that
the convergence of va (.) to v¯ is at least linear in kA− a¯k+ °°M¯ − m¯°°
Lemma 2 As shocks become small, va (.) converges to v¯ and
lim
kA−a¯k+kM¯−m¯k→0
kva (.)− v¯k
kA− a¯k+ °°M¯ − m¯°° <∞
Proof. See appendix
The following Lemma says that the economy with small aggregate shocks and no idiosyn-
cratic shocks is well approximated by the functions xˆ (.) and vˆ (.).
Lemma 3 As shocks become small, va (.)− v¯ converges to vˆ (.), in the sense that
lim
kA−a¯k+kM¯−m¯k→0
kva (.)− v¯ − vˆ (.)k
kA− a¯k+ °°M¯ − m¯°° = 0
and xa (.)− x¯ converges to xˆ (.)
lim
kA−a¯k+kM¯−m¯k→0
kxa (.)− x¯− xˆ (.)k
kA− a¯k+ °°M¯ − m¯°° = 0
Proof. See appendix
2.2 No Aggregate Shocks
In this section, I assume that a (s) = a¯ and m¯ (s) = m¯ for all s, and I focus on idiosyncratic
shocks. Define v˜ (.) and x˜ (.) as the solutions to
v˜ (η) := a¯+ η − Γ (x˜η) + (1 + x˜η) m¯E
£
v˜
¡
η0
¢ |η¤ (13)
and
γ (x˜η) = m¯E
£
v˜
¡
η0
¢ |η¤ (14)
The average investment rate in this economy is given by
R
γ−1 (m¯E [v˜ (η0) |η]) ζ¯ (η) dη. This
average rate converges to x¯ when kΩk → 0, but is in general different from x¯. In this
economy, because of constant returns to scale, there is no tendency of firm size to mean
revert, so one must be careful when studying limiting distributions. Suppose, without loss
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of generality, that all firms start with one unit of capital at time t = 0, i.e., kj,0 = 1 for all
j. The capital stock of a firm j at time T is then
log (kj,T ) =
T−1X
t=0
log (1 + x˜j,t)
By the law of large numbers, we know that
log(kj,T )
T converges in mean squares toE
ζ¯ [log (1 + x˜ (η))],
which I assume to be strictly positive.3 Clearly, there is no ergodic distribution for kj,t. Let
f˜ (kt, ηt, t) be the joint distribution of k and η at time t. It evolves according to the law of
motion
f˜
¡
kt+1, ηt+1, t+ 1
¢
=
Z
ηt∈Ω
ÃZ
kt=
kt+1
1+x˜(ηt)
f˜ (kt, ηt, t) dkt
!
ζ
¡
ηt, ηt+1
¢
dηt.
Define the aggregate stock of capital at time t by k¯t :=
R R
ktf˜ (kt, ηt, t) dktdηt. Since
kjt
exp(1+tEζ¯ [log(1+x˜(η))])
p−→ 1, we see that the scaled aggregate capital stock converges in
probability
k¯t
exp
¡
1 + tE ζ¯ [log (1 + x˜ (η))]
¢ p−→ 1.
Similarly, defining aggregate investment by ı¯t :=
R R
(x˜ (ηt) + δ) ktf˜ (kt, ηt, t) dktdηt, we see
that the aggregate investment rate ı¯tk¯t converges in probability
ı¯t
k¯t
p−→ Eζ¯ [x˜ (η)] + δ.
After a long time, the aggregate investment rate is constant and equal to the uncondi-
tional mean of the firm level investment rate. Note that the key for this result is that
E ζ¯ [log (1 + x˜ (η))] > 0: as the economy grows, the aggregate capital stock becomes very
large, and differences in k across firms, even though they are infinitely large in absolute
terms, become small relative to the aggregate capital stock. To study ı¯tk¯t , we can thus safely
assume that all firms have the same capital stock, and that the heterogeneity is simply due
to η.
3 In fact, since ζ (., .) is ergodic and Ω is bounded, a central limit theorem holds, and
√
T

log(kjT )
T −E
ζ¯ [log (1 + x (η))]

→ N (0, σ˜) where the variance is given by σ˜2 = varζ¯ log (1 + x˜η) +
2
S∞
τ=1 cov
ζ¯ (log (1 + x˜t) , log (1 + x˜t+τ )).
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2.3 General Case
In the general case, there are both aggregate and firm level shocks. The following Lemma
shows that, when aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks are small, the value function is well
approximated by the sum of an idiosyncratic and an aggregate component. The same is
true for the policy function and for the aggregate investment rate.
Lemma 4 v˜ (η) + vˆ (s) is a first order approximation to v (s, η), in the sense that
lim
kA−a¯k+kM¯−m¯k+kΩk→0
sups,η (v (s, η)− v˜ (η)− vˆ (s))
kA− a¯k+ °°M¯ − m¯°°+ kΩk = 0.
Similarly, x˜ (η)− xˆ (s) is a first order approximation to the policy function
lim
kA−a¯k+kM¯−m¯k+kΩk→0
sups,η (x (s, η)− x˜ (η)− xˆ (s))
kA− a¯k+ °°M¯ − m¯°°+ kΩk = 0.
The aggregate investment rate converges to
lim
kA−a¯k+kM¯−m¯k+kΩk→0
¯¯¯
ı¯t
k¯t
−E ζ¯ [x˜ (η)]− δ − xˆ (st)
¯¯¯
kA− a¯k+ °°M¯ − m¯°°+ kΩk = 0, for all t.
The proof of Lemma 4 is a straightforward extension of the proof of Lemma 3 and is
omitted. It is important to emphasize that both the aggregate and the idiosyncratic shocks
must be small, because the convexity of Γ (.) creates interaction effects between aggregate
and idiosyncratic shocks. Therefore, it is not enough for aggregate shocks to be small in
order to get additive separability of the value function into vˆ and v˜. It is legitimate to
wonder what happens when idiosyncratic shocks are only second-order small, and I address
this issue in section 5.
3 Corporate Yields and Aggregate Investment
I now derive the relationship between the average yield on corporate bonds and the aggregate
investment rate. In this section, I restrict my attention to short term corporate debt. I
extend the analysis to long term debt in section 5.
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3.1 Short Term Bond Prices
Equation (7) gives the value of the one-period bond issued by a firm in the state (s, η). It
can be written as
b (s, η) = m¯sd (s, η)− m¯s
X
s0∈S
πs,s0
Z
v(s0,η0)<d(s,η)
¡
d (s, η)− v
¡
s0, η0
¢¢
ζ
¡
η, η0
¢
dη0
The first term is the discounted face value. The second term is the discounted value of
credit losses. Integrating over the ergodic distribution of η, I define the aggregate bond
price as b (s) :=
R
Ω b (s, η) ζ¯ (η) dη, and the aggregate default loss in state s
0 as
L
¡
s, s0
¢
:=
Z
η∈Ω
ζ¯ (η)
"Z
v(s0,η0)<d(s,η)
¡
d (s, η)− v
¡
s0, η0
¢¢
ζ
¡
η, η0
¢
dη0
#
dη. (15)
so that, by definition,
b (s) = m¯s
Z
η∈Ω
d (s, η) ζ¯ (η) dη − m¯s
X
s0∈S
πs,s0L
¡
s, s0
¢
.
I specify the dynamics of d (s, η) as
d (s, η) = dˆ (s) + d˜ (η) ,
normalized so that dˆ (s¯) = 0, and I define d¯ as the mean of d˜. Then, using the approximations
of Lemma 4 that v (s, η) ≈ v˜ (η) + vˆ (s), I find that4
Lemma 5 The first-order approximation of the credit loss function L (.) is
L
¡
s, s0
¢
≈ θ¯
³
l¯d¯+ dˆ (s)− vˆ
¡
s0
¢´
,
where l¯ is the average loss-rate given default and θ¯ is the average default rate
θ¯ :=
Z
v˜(η0)<d¯
ζ¯
¡
η0
¢
dη0.
Proof. See appendix
For small aggregate shocks, we therefore find that the average bond price is, to a first order,
given by
b (s) ≈ m¯sd¯
¡
1− θ¯l¯
¢
+ m¯
¡
1− θ¯
¢
dˆ (s) + θ¯m¯
X
s0∈S
πs,s0 vˆ
¡
s0
¢
. (16)
4To lighten the notations, I use the symbol ≈ to denote first order approximation.
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This equation has a very natural interpretation. The market value of debt depends on three
factors. The first term is the discounted value of the average recovery rate. The second
term captures time variation in debt issuance: the higher the face value, all else equal, the
higher the market value. The last term captures the effect of the future macroeconomic
conditions on the average recovery rate. In this last term, the future marginal product of
capital is scaled by θ¯, the likelihood of default evaluated at the risk neutral steady state.
3.2 The y-Theory of Investment
Consider now the first order approximation to the investment equation (6): γ (x (s, η)) ≈
γ0 + γ1 (x˜ (η) + xˆ (s)). Integrating over η, we get
γ1xˆ (s) ≈ (m¯s − m¯) v¯ + m¯sEπ
£
vˆ
¡
s0
¢ |s¤
where v¯ := E ζ¯ [v˜ (η)], x¯ := E ζ¯ [x˜ (η)] and γ0 + γ1x¯ = m¯v¯. Therefore, using equation (16)
and defining the average risky yield y (s) := db(s) − 1, we obtain
xˆ (s) ≈ r − r (s)
(1 + r) (1 + r (s))
v¯
γ1
+
d¯
γ1θ¯ (1 + r (s))
µ
1 + r (s)
1 + y (s)
− 1 + r
1 + y¯
¶
+
dˆ (s)
γ1
1− l¯
1 + r
(17)
where r (s) is the one period real risk free rate.
We can summarize our finding in the following theorem
Theorem 1 When aggregate shocks and firm level shocks are small, there exists a linear
combination of risk free yields, risky corporate yields and book leverage that is a sufficient
statistic for aggregate investment.
A practical issue that I have not discussed so far is inflation. Modern research in asset
pricing suggests that real risk free rates do not vary much over time. Suppose that real
rates are exactly constant, and let y$ (s) and r$ (s) denote nominal yields. Then, we have
the following corollary:
Corollary 1 If the real risk free rate is constant, then
xˆ (s) ≈ d¯
γ1θ¯ (1 + r)
Ã
1 + r$ (s)
1 + y$ (s)
− 1 + r¯
$
1 + y¯$
!
+
dˆ (s)
γ1
1− l¯
1 + r
(18)
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4 Empirical Estimates
4.1 Data Description
In equation (18), the key variable is 1+r
$(s)
1+y$(s) , the price of corporate bonds relative to trea-
suries. As shown in Figure 1, the spreads of corporate bonds over treasuries have increased
over the post-war period. Campbell and Taksler (2003) argue that this is due to a secular
increase in the volatility of publicly traded companies.5 I use Moody’s Baa index (yBaat ) as
my main measure of the yield on risky corporate debt. Moody’s index is the equal weighted
average of yields on Baa-rated bonds issued by large non financial corporations. To be
included in the index, a bond must have a face value of at least 100 million, an initial ma-
turity of at least 20 years, and most importantly, a liquid secondary market. Beyond these
characteristics, Moody’s has some discretion on the selection of the bonds. The number of
bonds included in the index varies from 75 and 100 in any given year. The main advantages
of Moody’s measure are that it is available since 1919, and that it is broadly representative
of the U.S. non financial sector, since Baa is close to the median among rated companies.
On the other hand, the main issue with this measure is maturity. The theory presented
above is based on the yield on short term bonds, but yBaat is an average among outstanding
bonds of different maturities. This creates two problems. First, it is not obvious which
treasury yield one should use as a benchmark. I will follow the literature and use the 10-
year treasury yield.6 Second, if the term structure of default spreads is not flat, using a
long yield to estimate the price of a one-year bond might introduce measurement errors.
In section 5, I consider the case of infinite horizon debt, and I use numerical simulations
to show the robustness of the results. For now, however, I focus on 1+r
10
t
1+yBaat
as my main
proxy for 1+r
$(s)
1+y$(s) , where r
10
t is the yield on a 10-year constant maturity treasury and ybaat
is Moody’s yield for an index of Baa bonds. Both variables are obtained from FRED R°.7
The variables are described in Table 1a.
5See Comin and Philippon (2005) for a discussion, and Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2006)
for evidence on privately held companies.
6All the results presented below are robust to using a 20-year risk free yield (which is not available on as
long a sample, however).
7Federal Reserve Economic Data: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/
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4.2 Regression Results
Constant real rates and constant book leverage
Suppose that the real rate and book leverage are constant, i.e. m¯s ≡ 11+r and dˆ (s) ≡ 0.
Then equation (18) becomes
xˆ (s) ≈ d¯
γ1θ¯ (1 + r)
1 + r$ (s)
1 + y$ (s)
+ cte, (19)
where r$ (s) is the nominal risk free rate, and y$ (s) is the nominal yield on corporate bonds.
Because of the persistence in the investment rate and the other variables, as reported in
Table 1a, I estimate equation (19) in changes, rather than in levels.8 The dependent
variable is thus the year-to-year change in the annual investment rate ∆
¡ i
k
¢
and the first
estimation equation is simply
∆
µ
it
kt
¶
= α+ β∆
µ
1 + r10t
1 + yBaat
¶
, (20)
where it is real aggregate non-residential fixed investment, and kt is the capital stock con-
structed using the investment series and a depreciation rate of δ = 12%. Table 2 reports
the results. Each column corresponds to a different specification. Column (i) presents
the results from estimating equation (20). The regression of annual change in ik on an-
nual change in the relative price of defaultable bonds has an adjusted R2 of 42%. We can
interpret column (i) as saying that
d¯
γ1θ¯ (1 + r)
≈ 1.9
The mean book leverage is around 5% for short term debt and 20% for long term debt, and
it is customary in the empirical credit risk literature to use short term debt plus half of long
term debt as a proxy for d¯ (see Moody’s KMV methodology, as explained in Crosbie and
Bohn (2003)). So we can use d¯ = 15% as a benchmark. What is θ¯? It is the default rate in
the average risk-neutral state. Table 1b shows that the average historical default rate for
Baa bonds (annualized from the 10-year cumulative rate) is around 0.5% over 1970-2001
and 0.8% over 1920-1999. The standard deviation of this rate is 0.25% over 1970-2001 and
8Another reason is that there is a slow-moving upward trend in the default probability, mostly reflecting
the increase in idiosyncratic risk, as explained in Campbell and Taksler (2003) and Comin and Philippon
(2005).
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0.9% over 1920-1999. Thus, the mean plus one standard deviation is between 0.75% and
1.7%. On the other hand, it is easy to see that θ¯ must be more than the average spread.
Assuming a recovery rate of 20%, we would get θ¯ between 2% and 3%. Let us take 2%.
Then we would get
γ1 ≈
15
1.03× 1.9× 2 ≈ 3.832.
Shapiro (1986) estimates γ between 8 and 9 using quarterly data, which corresponds to 2
to 2.2 at annual frequencies. Hall (2004) finds even smaller adjustment costs. Thus, the
y-theory brings a substantial improvement compared to estimates of more than 20 that one
would get from the equity based theory. Moreover, simple extensions to take into account
non-convexities at the firm level would likely decrease the implied γ1 further (see Caballero
and Engle (2005)).9
Another important fact to keep in mind is that the Baa spread is not a pure measure
of credit risk. There is an ongoing debate in the literature about the role of default risk in
explaining yield spreads. Because treasuries are more liquid than corporate bonds, part of
the spread should reflect a liquidity premium. Also, treasuries have a tax-advantage over
corporate bonds because they are not subject to state and local taxes. These arguments
suggest that we cannot attribute the entire spreads to default risk. Almeida and Philippon
(2005) discuss in details the various ways one can use to estimate the default component of
bond spreads, and find that roughly 3/4 of the spread is due to credit risk. Taken literally,
this means that we should multiply of estimated γ1 by 3/4 in order to obtain the correct
estimate: it would be 2.875.
Other Regressions
Column (ii) adds the 10-year treasury yield and the mean current liabilities over assets
of Baa firms as a measure of leverage. Column (ii) shows that it is really the spread
that matters, since the coefficient on the 10-year treasury is zero. The change in book
leverage has the predicted sign, and it is significant. Column (iii) introduces a cash flow
variable, earnings before interest and taxes over capital, as well as the market value of equity
9To keep things simple, I have used a purely convex model. But it is not a good approximation at the
firm level because of fixed costs and time-to-build. These issues will not disappear in the aggregate. If one
approximates lumpiness at the firm level in the Calvo way, it is straightforward to show that one should
scale the coefficient on the spread by the fraction of active companies to obtain the correct estimates. If only
half of the firms actively change their investment plans in any given period, then we would get γ1 around
1.9.
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over capital. Quite remarkably, the cash flow variable is not significant in the investment
equation, and neither is the market value of equity. So far, it seems that a model with
constant real risk-free interest rates, constant book leverage, and the bond spread as a
sufficient statistic, is not rejected by the data. The next three columns allow for different
coefficients on the current spread and its lag. Column (iv) shows a significant increase in
the R2, and the restriction that the sum of the coefficients is zero is rejected at the 1%
level. This suggests that the adjustment cost function might be misspecified, probably
because of non-convexities at the firm level, as in Caballero and Engle (1999). Column (v)
and (vi) suggest that controlling for book leverage can marginally improve the fit, while
equity does not seem to bring in a significant amount of new information. I have also run
regressions controlling for long term book leverage, which is not significant and leaves the
other coefficients unchanged.
5 Extensions and Robustness
5.1 Long Term Yields
For long term bonds, the pricing equation (8) can be integrated over η with the er-
godic distribution ζ¯ (.). This defines the aggregate long term bond price as b∞ (s) :=R
η0∈Ω b
∞ (s, η) ζ¯ (η) dη, and (8) becomes
b∞ (s) = m¯sc+ m¯s
X
s0∈S
πs,s0b∞
¡
s0
¢
− m¯s
X
s0∈S
πs,s0L∞
¡
s0
¢
, (21)
where
L∞
¡
s0
¢
:=
Z
v(s0,η0)<c+b∞(s0,η0)
¡
c+ b∞
¡
s0, η0
¢
− v
¡
s0, η0
¢¢
ζ¯
¡
η0
¢
dη0. (22)
Formula (21) and (22) are exact, but cannot be used directly in the investment equation.
At this point, and just like with short term debt, I make a first order approximation to
the function b∞ (s0, η0) in equation (8) as b∞ (s0, η0) ≈ bˆ∞ (s0)+ b˜∞ (η0), where b˜∞ (η0) is the
price that would prevail in the idiosyncratic economy. To a first order, equation (22) then
becomes
L∞
¡
s0
¢
≈ L¯∞ + θ¯∞
³
bˆ∞
¡
s0
¢
− vˆ
¡
s0
¢´
, (23)
where the average default rate is defined by θ¯∞ :=
R
v˜(η)<c+b˜∞(η) ζ¯ (η) dη and the average
loss rate by L¯∞ :=
R
v˜(η)<c+b˜∞(η)
³
c+ b˜∞ (η)− v˜ (η)
´
ζ¯ (η) dη. Substituting (23) into (21),
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and defining the average bond price b¯∞ :=
R
b˜∞ (η) ζ¯ (η) dη, and noting that b¯∞ = c−L¯
∞
r , I
find that
bˆ∞ (s) ≈ (m¯s − m¯) b¯∞ +
¡
1− θ¯∞
¢
m¯Eπ
h
bˆ∞
¡
s0
¢ |si+ θ¯∞m¯Eπ £vˆ ¡s0¢ |s¤ ,
while the investment equation is γ1xˆ (s) ≈ (m¯s − m¯) v¯+m¯Eπ [vˆ (s0) |s]. In matrix notations,
we get µ
I − 1− θ¯
∞
1 + r
Π
¶
Bˆ∞ = b¯∞Mˆ + θ¯∞m¯ΠVˆ ,
γ1Xˆ = v¯Mˆ + m¯ΠVˆ .
Therefore
γ1Xˆ =
µ
v¯ − b¯
∞
θ¯∞
¶
Mˆ +
µ
I − 1− θ¯
∞
1 + r
Π
¶
Bˆ∞
θ¯∞
.
The bond price is not a sufficient statistic for investment because of the off-diagonal elements
in the matrix Π. In the case of long term bonds, we must therefore extend our first order
approximation to the matrix Π by assuming that Π is close to being diagonal. This is a
new approximation, one that we did not need to make before. It extends the small shock
approximation that we have used so far, but it applies to the transition matrix. It says
that the system is not likely to jump from one extreme to the other. If Π is close to
being diagonal, then the response of xˆ to bˆ is r+θ¯
∞
(1+r)γ1θ¯
∞ , and with b∞ (s) = cy(s) we get
bˆ∞ (s) = − cy¯
yˆ(s)
y¯ = b¯
∞ yˆ(s)
y¯ and therefore
xt ∝ −
¡
r + θ¯∞
¢
b¯∞
(1 + r) γ1θ¯
∞
yˆ (s)
y¯
. (24)
If we implement this regression using the same data as in table 1, we get (
r+θ¯∞)b¯∞
(1+r)γ1θ¯
∞ ≈ 0.12.
Assuming that long term debt is on average b¯∞ = 20% of book assets, we get, with r = 3%
and θ¯∞ = 2%
γ1 ≈
5× 0.2
1.03× 0.12× 2 = 4.05.
I return to the issue of long term debt in section 5.4 where I perform numerical simulations.
5.2 Second Order Approximations
The appendix shows the approximation v (s, η) = v˜ (η)+ vˆ (s)+ηh (s) and characterizes the
function h (.). Consider the case of short term debt with constant book leverage. Note thatZ
v
¡
s0, η0
¢
ζ¯
¡
η0
¢
dη0 = vˆ
¡
s0
¢
+
Z
v˜
¡
η0
¢
ζ¯
¡
η0
¢
dη0,
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so that the RHS of the investment equation does not change. On the other hand, the loss
function becomes
L
¡
s, s0
¢
=
Z
v˜(η0)+vˆ(s0)+η0h(s0)<d¯
¡
d¯− v˜
¡
η0
¢
− vˆ
¡
s0
¢
− η0h
¡
s0
¢¢
ζ¯
¡
η0
¢
dη0,
= L¯− vˆ
¡
s0
¢
θ¯ − h
¡
s0
¢ Z
v˜(η0)<d¯
η0ζ¯
¡
η0
¢
dη0.
so h (s0) creates a measurement issue. The above equation shows the effect of an increase
in h: The integral is negative, so a higher value of h increases the credit losses. On the
other hand, as on can see in the appendix, h (s) increase with Eπ [vˆ (s0)]. Suppose good news
arrive: Investment increases, h increases, which indirectly increases credit losses. As a result,
bond prices do not rise as much as one would expect from the first order approximation.
This could lead to a bias in the estimation of γ1. To investigate this issue further, I use
numerical simulations in section 5.4.
5.3 Time Varying Idiosyncratic Risk
To study this issue, let us assume that idiosyncratic shocks are iid. Otherwise, keeping
track of the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks would be too complicated. In this case, all
the firms have the same bond price, the same investment rate and η simply affects the level
of the value function
v (s, η) = v¯ + η + vˆ (s) .
Suppose that the conditional distribution of η0 is ζ¯ (s, η0)
L
¡
s, s0
¢
=
Z
η0<d¯−v¯−vˆ(s0)
¡
d¯− v¯ − vˆ
¡
s0
¢
− η0
¢
ζ¯
¡
s, η0
¢
dη0.
The first order approximation is
L
¡
s, s0
¢
≈ L¯ (s)− vˆ
¡
s0
¢
θ¯ (s) ,
where θ¯ (s) :=
R
η0<d¯−v¯ ζ¯ (s, η
0) dη0 and L¯ (s) :=
R
η0<d¯−v¯
¡
d¯− v¯ − η0
¢
ζ¯ (s, η0) dη0. The bond
price is then
b (s) ≈ m¯s
¡
d¯− L¯ (s)
¢
+ θ¯ (s) m¯sEπ
£
vˆ
¡
s0
¢ |s¤ ,
and the investment equation becomes
γ1xˆ (s) ≈ (m¯s − m¯) v¯ +
b (s)− m¯s
¡
d¯− L¯ (s)
¢
θ¯ (s)
.
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The effect of time varying idiosyncratic risk is theoretically straightforward. In practice,
one can simply control for changes in idiosyncratic volatility. In column (vi) of Table 2,
I add the (change in) average idiosyncratic asset volatility of Baa-rated companies.10 The
change in mean asset volatility has the predicted sign and it is significant.
5.4 Numerical Simulations
In this section, I try to answer the following questions:
• how good is the first order approximation for estimating γ with aggregate data?
• how well would the y-theory perform on firm level data?
To do so, I first need to approximate the aggregate dynamics a (s), and the firm level
dynamics η. I assume that a and η can be approximated as AR(1) processes, and I estimate
the persistence of the processes using aggregate and firm level data
at = ρaat−1 + εat ,
ηt = ρ
ηηt−1 + ε
η
t .
For each firm, I define a + η as operating income before depreciation divided by the book
value of assets. I define a as the mean across all the firms rated and η as the residual. I
allow for a deterministic time trend in order to capture changes in the composition of the
sample and other non-stationarities, as discussed in Comin and Philippon (2005) and Davis,
Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2006). I find similar persistence for a for η of 0.75. I
then choose the volatility of the distribution of shocks to match the mean and standard
deviations of 1+r
10
t
1+yBaat
reported in Table 1a. Roughly speaking, the dispersion of η pins
down the average spread, and the dispersion of a (s) pins down how it changes over time.
The rest of the parameters are standard: r=4%, γ=4. The parameters needed to match
the data imply risk neutral volatilities of 0.012154 for a (s), and 0.12103 for η. I simulate
1000 observations, and I run equation (20) and (24) in the simulated data, at the firm level
10 I have used a simple Merton model for each Baa rated company and each year in order to extract asset
volatility. Equity volatility was estimated on the 12 month of each year, and the face value of debt was
computed as short term debt + one half of long term debt (as in the simplest version of KMV). Details are
available on request.
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and in the aggregate. The next table summarizes the results. For each regression, I report
the R2 and the ratio of the implied γˆ over the true γ, which is equal to 4.
Equation (20) (20) (24) (24)
γˆ/γ R2 γˆ/γ R2
Aggregate 0.70327 0.97413 1.3751 0.99033
Firm Level 3.8673 0.13247 2.9813 0.38957
Several findings emerge. Firstly, the aggregate regression deliver very high R2. Secondly,
despite the high R2, there can be a significant bias in the estimation of γ. The bias is down-
ward when one uses short term debt, and upward when one uses long term debt. Thirdly,
the performance of the model deteriorates substantially when we move from aggregate to
firm level data. This underlines the importance of averaging across firms. Note also that
the direction of the bias in the short debt equation is reversed. Finally, at the firm level,
the R2 of the long term debt equation is substantially higher than the one of the short term
equation. Estimating equations (20) and (24) on firm level data is an important task for
future research.11
6 Discussion
I show theoretically that, in an economy where aggregate shocks are small and there is a
continuous distribution of firms, aggregate q is a simple function of the risk free rate and
of the average yield on risky corporate debt. Empirically, I find that y-theory explains
aggregate investment reasonably well. Numerical simulations suggest that y-theory might
also be useful at the firm level. I now discuss the implications of this finding for the existing
research on corporate investment, and I mention the remaining puzzles that need to be
addressed.
On the failure of q-theory
One could summarize my results by saying that aggregate q-theory seems to work fine,
provided one uses the bond market instead of the equity market to construct one’s measure
of q. Keeping this fact in mind, let us revisit the various explanations that have been
proposed in the literature for the failure of q-theory. The q-theory relies on a first order
condition linking a firm’s investment rate I/K to the firm’s Tobin’s Q. The theory could
11The practical issue is to obtain reliable bond prices at the firm level.
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therefore fail if the first order condition does not hold at the firm level, because of credit
constraints (Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), Bernanke and Gertler (1989)) or non-
convexities (Caballero and Engle (1999)) for instance. If these issues caused the q-theory
to fail, however, they would cause the y-theory to fail as well, since the underlying equation
is the same.
The theory could also fail because of measurement errors (Erickson and Whited (2000)).
It is important to separate measurement errors in I orK from issues involving market prices.
Measurement errors in I or in K — due to improper accounting, incorrect depreciation rates,
aggregation across heterogenous types of capital, failure to take into account intangibles and
human capital — would affect my investment equations as well.
Thus, it seems unlikely that credit constraints, fixed costs and measurement errors in I
or in K are responsible for the first order failures of q-theory in the aggregate, and it seems
more likely that the issue lies in the behavior of the market value of equity.12
Equity prices versus bond prices
Why is the equity-based investment equation less successful than the bond-spread invest-
ment equation? It is important to understand that there are two separate issues here. The
first is why the correlation between equity and bond prices is so low in the data, given
that, with small aggregate shocks, we would expect a very high correlation. The presence
of bubbles in equity prices but not in bond prices is a potential explanation for the observed
low correlation. Another is the presence of large growth options: a small probability of a
large increase in the present value of assets would have almost no impact on bond prices,
and a large impact on equity prices.
The second issue is why investment does not respond more to equity prices. One expla-
nation is that firms choose not to respond, either because they perceive the equity prices to
be disconnected from fundamentals, or because of adverse selection in the equity issuance
market. Another explanation, suggested by Abel and Eberly (2005), is that firms cannot
invest before the growth options are realized. It is as if firms faced two types of adjust-
ment costs, the ones for normal investment, well captured by convex costs, and the ones
12Erickson and Whited (2006) reach a similar conclusion using an econometric approach to deal with the
measurement errors. They find that most of the measurement errors responsible for the failure of q-theory
are in the market value V , not in K. In their terminology, measurement errors in V include bubbles and
other deviations of market values from fundamentals.
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for growth options, highly non-convex. This would seem to be consistent with the fact that
IPOs are well explained by equity market valuations, while the bulk of capital expenditures
is well explained by bond market valuations.
On the importance of risk premia in macroeconomics
It is well known in the credit risk literature that risk premia explain a large fraction of
credit spreads. Given that these spreads account for most of investment dynamics, one
should conclude that risk premia are important for macroeconomic dynamics. Yet, risk
premia play essentially no role in the standard business cycle model of Kydland and Prescott
(1982).13
Much of the investment literature abstracts from risk premia. On the empirical side,
Abel and Blanchard (1986) construct a time series for marginal q that takes into account
changes in the risk free rate, while abstracting from changes in risk premia. In this setup,
changes in aggregate investment are driven either by changes in the (real) risk free rate, or
by news about future aggregate profitability. The ex-ante real rate is neither volatile nor
very correlated with aggregate investment, however, and aggregate cash flows news explain
little of the variation in aggregate valuations, as shown by Shiller (1981). Compared to the
approach in Abel and Blanchard (1986), the yield theory has the advantage of taking into
account changes in risk premia over time.
On the theoretical side, the leading papers focusing on credit constraints, such as
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), assume that investors are
risk neutral. In this case, it is the objective probability of financial distress that matters for
investment. This objective probability, however, is much smaller that the risk adjusted one,
as shown in Berndt, Douglas, Duffie, Ferguson, and Schranz (2005). Thus, irrespective of
whether firms are indeed constrained or not, one should not neglect the effects of investor
risk aversion.
Similarly, models of non-convex adjustment costs in the tradition of Caballero and En-
gle (1999) also rely on risk neutral investors for tractability. To the extent that one is
concerned with explaining firm level investment dynamics, the assumption of risk neutral
13Obtaining high risk premia in general equilibrium models is not straightforward. Tallarini (2000) builds
a real business cycle model where consumers’s preferences are modelled as in Epstein and Zin (1989), and
studies the consequences of high risk aversion for asset prices and macroeconomic dynamics.
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investors is probably fine, because much of the volatility at the firm level reflects cash flow
news, not discount rate shocks, as emphasized for instance in Vuolteenaho (2002). In the
aggregate, however, discount rate shocks are much more important. My results suggest that
understanding the nature of these macroeconomic shocks could be necessary and sufficient
to obtain a successful theory of aggregate investment.
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A Proofs
This appendix contains the proofs of the Lemmas mentioned in the main text.
Proof of Lemma 1
Define
' (x) := (r − x) γ (x) + Γ (x)− a¯
The function ' (.) is continuous over (−1,∞). Moreover
∂'
∂x
(x) = (r − x) ∂γ
∂x
(x)
so ' is increasing over (−1, r] and decreasing over [r,∞). If rγ (0) < a¯ < Γ (r), then
' (0) < 0 and ' (r) > 0, so there is a unique solution over (0, r). There might be another
over (r,∞), but it violates the transversality condition.
Proof of Lemma 2
First of all, it is clear that when kA− a¯k and °°M¯ − m¯°° are small enough, we can use
Lemma 1 to argue that va (.) exists and solves
va (s) = max
x>−1
©
a (s)− Γ (x) + (1 + x) m¯sEπ
£
va
¡
s0
¢ |s¤ª .
Then, we can define ov (s) := va (s) − v¯ and ox (s) := xa (s) − x¯, and it is also clear that
both kovk and kovk go to 0 when kA− a¯k + °°M¯ − m¯°° → 0. To show the stronger result
in the Lemma, let us assume that kA− a¯k and °°M¯ − m¯°° are small enough that there exist
a neighborhood Ξ of x¯ such that xa (s) ∈ Ξ for all s and a neighborhood ( of r such that
r (s) ∈ ( for all s and
xmax = supΞ < rmin = inf (
Note that this is possible under assumption (10). Then notice that
m¯sEπ
£
va
¡
s0
¢ |s¤ ≤ amax − Γ (xmax)
rmin − xmax
for all s ∈ S
Using the investment equation, this implies that
χ (xmax) ≤ amax,
where the function χ (.) is defined by
χ (x) := (rmin − x) γ (x) + Γ (x) .
The function χ (.) is strictly increasing over Ξ, and its derivative can be bounded below by
some strictly positive number 
∂χ (x)
∂x
= (rmin − x)
∂γ (x)
∂x
>  > 0 for all x ∈ Ξ,
which implies that χ (xmax) >  (xmax − x¯) + χ (x¯). Now, given the definition of x¯, we see
that χ (x¯) = (rmin − r) γ (x¯) + a¯ and therefore
xmax − x¯ <
amax − a¯+ (r − rmin) γ (x¯)

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This last inequality then implies that
lim
kA−a¯k+kM¯−m¯k→0
xmax − x¯
kA− a¯k+ °°M¯ − m¯°° <∞
The same strategy applies to the lower bound xmin, and it is then straightforward to extend
to the value function to prove the Lemma.
Proof of Lemma 3
By the mean value theorem, there exist x˜s ∈ [x¯, xs] such that
Γ (xs) = Γ (x¯) + ox (s) γ (x˜s)
and thus
ka (.)− a¯− Γ (.) + Γ (x¯)k ≤ ka (.)− a¯k+max
s
{γ (x˜s)} koxsk
The function ov (s) satisfies
v¯ + ov (s) = a (s)− Γ (xs) + (1 + x¯+ ox (s))
¡
m¯sv¯ + m¯sEπ
£
ov
¡
s0
¢ |s¤¢
Using the investment equation and the definitions of v¯ and vˆ (s), we get
ov (s)−vˆ (s) = oxs
¡
m¯sEπ
£
va
¡
s0
¢ |s¤− γ (x˜s)¢+(1 + x¯) ¡(m¯s − m¯)Eπ £ov ¡s0¢ |s¤+ m¯Eπ £ov ¡s0¢− vˆ ¡s0¢ |s¤¢
Therefore
kovs − vˆ (s)k ≤
koxsk km¯sEπ [va (s0) |s]− γ (x˜s)k+ (1 + x¯)
°°M¯ − m¯°° kovsk
1− (1 + x¯) m¯
By continuity of γ (.), and using the first order condition for investment in the pseudo-steady
state, we know that
lim
kA−a¯k+kM¯−m¯k→0
°°m¯sEπ £va ¡s0¢ |s¤− γ (x˜s)°° = 0,
and therefore, using Lemma 2, we get
lim
kA−a¯k+kM¯−m¯k→0
kovs − vˆ (s)k
kA− a¯k+ °°M¯ − m¯°° = 0.
Proof of Lemma 5
Let us consider a small change in d
d = d¯+ ε
Then, using Leibniz’s formulaZ
v(s0,η0)<d¯+ε
¡
d¯+ ε− v
¡
s0, η0
¢¢
ζ
¡
η, η0
¢
dη0
≈
Z
v(s0,η0)<d¯
¡
d¯− v
¡
s0, η0
¢¢
ζ
¡
η, η0
¢
dη0 + ε
Z
v(s0,η0)<d¯
ζ
¡
η, η0
¢
dη0
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Applying to ε = d1 (s) + d2 (η), we get
L
¡
s, s0
¢
≈
Z
v(s0,η0)<d¯
¡
d¯− v
¡
s0, η0
¢¢
ζ¯
¡
η0
¢
dη0
+
Z
η∈Ω
(d1 (s) + d2 (η)) ζ¯ (η)
ÃZ
v(s0,η0)<d¯
ζ
¡
η, η0
¢
dη0
!
dη
Using Leibniz’s formula to small changes in v, and neglecting second order terms
L
¡
s, s0
¢
≈
Z
v˜(η0)<d¯
¡
d¯− v
¡
s0, η0
¢¢
ζ¯
¡
η0
¢
dη0 + d1 (s)
Z
v˜(η0)<d¯
ζ¯
¡
η0
¢
dη0
+
Z
η∈Ω
ÃZ
v˜(η0)<d¯
ζ
¡
η, η0
¢
dη0
!
d2 (η) ζ¯ (η) dη
Define
L¯ :=
Z
v˜(η0)<d¯
¡
d¯− v˜
¡
η0
¢¢
ζ¯
¡
η0
¢
dη0 +
Z
η∈Ω
ÃZ
v˜(η0)<d¯
ζ
¡
η, η0
¢
dη0
!
d2 (η) ζ¯ (η) dη
and
θ¯ :=
Z
v˜(η0)<d¯
ζ¯
¡
η0
¢
dη0
to get
L
¡
s, s0
¢
= L¯+ θ¯
¡
d1 (s)− vˆ
¡
s0
¢¢
Second Order Approximation
Suppose that aggregate shocks are first order small, and firm level shocks are second order
small. Then, write
v (s, η) ≈ v˜ (η) + vˆ (s) + ηh (s)
The value function satisfies
v (s, η) = max
x>−1
©
a (s) + η − Γ (x) + (1 + x) m¯sEπ
£
v
¡
s0, η0
¢ |s, η¤ª
Differentiating the value function with respect to aggregate shocks, we get
∆v (s, η) = ∆a (s) + (1 + x)
¡
∆m¯ (s)Eπ [v˜ (η)] + m¯Eπ
£
vˆ
¡
s0
¢
+ η0h
¡
s0
¢ |s, η¤¢
and then with respect to idiosyncratic shocks
∂∆v (s, η)
∂η
=
∂x˜
∂η
× ¡∆m¯ (s)Eπ [v˜ (η)] + m¯Eπ £vˆ ¡s0¢+ η0h ¡s0¢ |s, η¤¢
+(1 + x¯)× ∂
∂η
¡
∆m¯ (s)Eπ [v˜ (η)] + m¯Eπ
£
vˆ
¡
s0
¢
+ η0h
¡
s0
¢ |s, η¤¢
A second order expansion of the idiosyncratic component gives
v˜ (η) = v¯ + v˜1η + v˜2η2
x˜ (η) = x¯+ x˜1η + x˜2η2
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and neglecting the small terms, we get
h (s) =
∙
∂x˜
∂η
¸
η=0
¡
∆m¯ (s) v¯ + m¯Eπ
£
vˆ
¡
s0
¢ |s¤¢
+(1 + x¯)
∙
∂E [η0|η]
∂η
¸
η=0
Ã
∆m¯ (s)
∙
∂v˜
∂η
¸
η=0
+ m¯Eπ
£
h
¡
s0
¢ |s¤!
The driving forces are m¯ (s) − m¯ and Eπ [vˆ (s0) |s]. From the investment equation, we see
that ∙
∂x˜
∂η
¸
=
m¯χ
γ1
∙
∂v˜
∂η
¸
η=0
where χ =
h
∂E[η0|η]
∂η
i
η=0
, and
h (s) =
m¯χ
γ1
∙
∂v˜
∂η
¸
η=0
m¯Eπ
£
vˆ
¡
s0
¢ |s¤
+(1 + x¯)χm¯Eπ
£
h
¡
s0
¢ |s¤
+χ∆m¯ (s)
∙
∂v˜
∂η
¸
η=0
µ
1 + x¯+
m¯
γ1
v¯
¶
v = a¯− Γ (x) + (1 + x) m¯v
and from the value function equation
v˜ (η) = a¯+ η − Γ (x˜η) + (1 + x˜η) m¯E
£
v˜
¡
η0
¢ |η¤∙
∂v˜
∂η
¸
η=0
=
1
1− (1 + x¯) m¯
h
∂E[η0|η]
∂η
i
η=0
So ∙
∂x˜
∂η
¸
=
1
γ1
m¯χ
1− (1 + x¯) m¯χ
So
h (s) =
1
γ1
m¯χ
1− (1 + x¯) m¯χ
¡
∆m¯ (s) v¯ + m¯Eπ
£
vˆ
¡
s0
¢ |s¤¢
+(1 + x¯)χ
Ã
∆m¯ (s)
∙
∂v˜
∂η
¸
η=0
+ m¯Eπ
£
h
¡
s0
¢ |s¤!
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Data Source Mean St. Dev. Min Max Auto-correlation
I / K NIPA 0.165 0.017 0.134 0.200 0.758
(1+r10) / (1+yBaa) FRED 0.988 0.005 0.978 0.996 0.766
(1+r10) / (1+yBaa) post 1980 FRED 0.985 0.003 0.978 0.989 0.598
Mean (Current Liabilities / 
Book Assets) of Baa firms COMPUSTAT 0.199 0.021 0.156 0.263 0.582
EBIT / K NIPA 0.285 0.049 0.188 0.405 0.869
Total Equity Value / K CRSP & NIPA 1.478 0.533 0.766 3.048 0.843
I / K 0.000 0.012 -0.026 0.021 0.2472
(1+r10) / (1+ybaa) 0.000 0.003 -0.006 0.005 0.0146
Mean (Current Liabilities / 
Book Assets) of BBB firms -0.001 0.019 -0.047 0.037 0.0496
EBIT / K -0.002 0.022 -0.047 0.060 0.0162
Equity / K 0.025 0.272 -0.575 0.449 0.1054
Table 1a: Summary Statistics
Variables in Levels. 1953-2004, 52 annual observations
Variables in First Difference, 51 annual observations
Years 1 5 10 20 1 5 10 1 5 10 20 1 10
Aaa 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.11 0.12 0.00 0.15
Aa 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.15 0.08 0.19 0.31 0.35 0.20 0.34
A 0.02 0.10 0.16 0.28 0.08 0.28 0.37 0.39 0.30 0.55
Baa 0.15 0.39 0.52 0.66 0.28 0.29 0.25 0.30 0.71 0.82 0.75 0.50 0.91
Ba 1.27 2.40 2.36 2.36 1.43 2.09 2.09 1.83 1.70 1.38
B 6.66 7.15 6.26 4.15 4.66 4.48 4.58 3.77 2.83 4.50 1.97
Caa-C 21.99 15.46 13.78 7.86
Investment-Grade 0.06 0.18 0.25 0.36 0.16 0.40 0.50 0.48 0.58
Speculative-Grade 4.73 4.60 3.83 3.09 3.35 3.33 2.88 2.34 1.52
All Corporates 1.54 1.37 1.09 0.89 1.07 1.33 1.37 1.21 0.97 0.88
(%, annualized from cumulative)
1970-2001
Std. Dev. of Default Rate
Table 1b: Descriptive Statistics on Bond Default Rates 
1920-1999
Mean Default Rates Std DevMean Default Rates
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vi)
Change in (1+r10) / (1+yBaa) 1.893 1.772 1.363 1.909
6.03 5.91 3.62 6.82
Change in 1 / (1+r10) -0.012
-0.08
Change in Current Liabilities / Assets 0.203 0.209 0.165
3.15 3.45 2.72
Change in EBIT over Capital 0.113
1.66
Change in Equity over Capital 0.001
0.15
Change in Mean Asset Volatility 0.192
2.41
(1+r10) / (1+yBaa) 2.296 2.274 1.845
7.86 7.59 4.8
Lagged (1+r10) / (1+yBaa) -1.523 -1.55 -1.048
-5.26 -5.6 -2.68
Current Liabilities / Assets 0.193 0.167
3.15 2.58
Lagged Current Liabilities / Assets -0.131 -0.149
-2.04 -2.32
EBIT over Capital 0.107
1.73
Lagged EBIT over Capital -0.126
-1.89
Equity over Capital 0.001
0.16
Lagged Equity over Capital 0.002
0.53
Constant 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.761 -0.725 -0.787 0.001
0.46 0.66 0.77 -4.02 -3.83 -2.65 0.67
N 51 51 51 51 51 51 51
R2 0.426 0.534 0.563 0.571 0.647 0.687 0.585
Adj. R2 0.414 0.504 0.525 0.553 0.616 0.627 0.559
Notes: Annual Data from 1953 to 2004. The capital stock is constructed assuming an annual depreciation rate of 12%. T-statistics are below the 
coefficients.
Table 2: Investment Equations
The dependent variable is the change in the investment capital ratio.
Figure 1: Price of Baa Bonds Relative to Treasuries
Note: The figure shows (1+r10) / (1+yBaa). The 10-year treasury is from FRED, the yield on Baa bonds is from Moody's.
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Figure 2: Annual Change in Investment-Capital Ratio
Note: the predicted value is from the regression reported in column (iv) of Table 2.
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